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THE REGULATORY PROCESS
MAPX S. MASsEL*
We need to take a fresh look at the regulatory process. In recent years, we have
been offered many criticisms of the administrative agencies, some suggested changes,
and a few defenses. However, much of the discussion is so repetitive that it seems
like an exercise in pouring old beer into new steins-producing a stale, flat potion.
In the main, these deliberations do not encourage affirmative analysis of the more
pressing problems of government regulation. Nor do they offer a firm basis for
imaginative inquiry into the substance of public policy, rather than the form.
The discussions have reflected a familiar preoccupation with limited procedural
technicalities, rather than an active interest in the practical problems of administra-
tive regulation and its results. Semantic tags have been employed widely, if not
wisely. The dichotomy of "rule-making" and "adjudication" has been employed
to describe the total regulatory process. Meanwhile, the important processes of
policy formulation, negotiation, and administration have been overlooked. Attention
has been riveted on the independent commissions. Accordingly, the equally im-
portant regulatory functions of the executive departments have escaped notice.
In the almost ritualistic procession of critical moves and defensive countermoves,
consideration has been confined largely to peripheral issues of procedure and
organization. Substantial policy issues have been swept under the rug. The
objectives of the regulations, together with their achievements, or failures, have been
virtually disregarded in the search for changes in administrative form.
Most importantly, government regulation has been treated as an insulated, tech-
nical activity of government. Much of the discussion has been founded on the
implication-stronger because unstated-that regulation is a legal function that can
be protected from the contamination of other government activities. This academic
assumption has been so imbedded that most of the debating gambits have overlooked
three significant features of the regulatory process: first, it is inherently a political
activity that is a substantial element in modern economies; second, the regulatory
functions are too intertwined with a host of other government activities to be set
as a class apart; and third, while procedural problems are important, they are sub-
sidiary to the objectives and accomplishments of the regulatory functions.
Adequate consideration of the policy issues that are inherent in the regulatory
process will depend upon a continuing awareness of our traditional anxiety about
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government regulation, an anxiety that stems from our inability to make clear-cut
decisions about what functions we want government to undertake. Our ultimate
public policy goals are an interesting compound of social, economic, political, and
international aims. Many of these aims conflict with each other. At least, they
give such an appearance. For social and political reasons, we want many in-
dependent private enterprises because we believe that they will insure the effective
working of the democratic process and equality of opportunity; at the same time, we
look to large corporate aggregations to satisfy certain economic and military ob-
jectives. Many look to government for the solutions to broad economic and social
problems; but others are restive about government interference. We want to assure
everyone of his day in court; yet, we are unhappy with the lengthy administrative
hearings that this objective entails.
Unfortunately, these ambivalent feelings about regulation have produced an
analytical quirk. We habitually compare the actual results of one alternative with
the theoretical workings of another. For example, when we discuss the regulatory
process, we tend to compare its present operations with the theoretical advantages
of competition. Conversely, when we consider competition, we are apt to contrast
the current conditions of the market place with the theoretical perfection of regula-
lation.
This quirk extends into our considerations of the regulatory processes. Critics
who emphasize the commissions' failure to formulate policy frequently paint an ideal-
ized picture of congressional capacity to make sharp policy decisions. Others com-
pare Congress' hesitation to set down understandable rules with an optimistic por-
trayal of effective political leadership in the executive branch.
The dynamic pressures affecting our national life require a basic reorientation in
our approaches to the regulatory process. We can no longer meet the requirements
of current policy problems with technical changes in procedure. These issues re-
quire substantial attention to questions of substance. They call for broad-gauge
consideration of the regulatory process in the context of the full range of government
activities, rather than the narrow field of legal procedures.
To this end, this paper briefly reviews the criticisms of the agencies. It then
sketches in an analysis of the assumptions that underlie this criticism. Finally, it
suggests some impressions of what types of analyses are needed for evaluation of the
regulatory process--evaluation that is an essential ingredient of improvement.
I
CluTICISMS AND PROPOSALS
The current century has produced a proliferation of governmental regulatory
activities. Each development has quickly produced successive waves of critiques,
defenses, and suggested improvements. While there has been a stimulating variety
in the expository details, the underlying patterns of criticism and cure have remained
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unchanged. For example, proposals for the abolition of the administrative agencies
appear at irregular intervals; some made about twenty-five years ago were repeated
recently. Complaints about the inefficiency and ineffectiveness of the commissions
made by Henderson in 19241 have their counterparts in more recent reports by
American Bar Association committees,2 Hoover Commission Task Forces, and such
writers as Hector4 and Landis.'
The criticisms and suggestions need no elaboration here. A quick review of
their major elements should suffice for our present purposes.
Criticism has taken several tacks covering a wide range: inefficiency; undue
delay and expense in regulatory procedures; prejudgments of controversies; lack of
rules; enunciated rules are too detailed, too complex, and too tight; too many ex
parte influences; too much contact with the regulated industry; too little under.
standing of the problems of the industry; too much power in the hands of the
staff; commissioners' failure to write their own opinions; inadequate personnel on
commissions and their staffs; corruption; "sandbagging" of companies and private
citizens; and lack of coordination.
Similarly, suggested cures have a familiar ring: set up administrative courts;
assign legislative functions to the Congress, adjudication to the courts, and admin-
istrative work to the executive branch; reshape the agencies in the image of the
courts; extend terms of commissioners to ten years; require that commissioners write
their own opinions; prohibit or regulate ex parte communications; establish policy
leadership through a presidential overseer; and improve personnel.
It is noteworthy that the major legislation that has been passed to effectuate a
"cure" was concerned with procedural problems exclusively. The Administrative
Procedure Act,6 as its name implies, dealt with procedures for enunciating rules,
instituting and processing cases, holding hearings, and issuing decisions. It set up
barriers between prosecuting and judicial functions by blocking off communications
within the agency. For example, the Federal Trade Commission, itself, may not
consult its own staff of economists or accountants when it reviews the decision of a
hearing examiner. This rule emerges because the Commission's economists are
employed in divisions that are called upon to aid the counsel supporting the com-
plaint.
'GERARD C. HENDE.SON, ThE FEDERAL TADE CommiSSioN (1924).
'ABA Special Comm. on Legal Services and Procedure, Report, 8I A.B.A. REP. 491 (1956); ABA
Special Comm. on Administrative Law, Report, 6I A.B.A. REP. 720 (1936).
S COMM'N ON ORGANIZATION OP THE ExEcUTIvE BRANCH OP THE GOVERNMENT, TASK FORCE REPORT
ON LEGAL SER IcEs AND PROCEDURE (1955), TASK FORCE REPORT ON REGULATORY CoMmissioNs (1949).
'Hector, Problems of the CAB and the Independent Regulatory Commissions, 69 YALE L.J. 931
(196o) [this report has been published as a committee print by the Senate Committee on Government
Organization, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (i96o)], The New Critique of the Regulatory Agency, 12 AD. L.
BULL. 12 (1959).
'Landis, The Administrative Process: The Third Decade, 47 A.B.A.J. 135 (1961); JAMES M. LANDIs,
REPORT ON REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT (i960) [this report has been published as a
committee print by the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (i96o)].
,1 6o Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. §§ iooi-ii (1958).
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II
UNDERLYING ASSUMPIONS
While much of the criticism is merited, there has been no systematic evaluation
of either the critiques or the suggested cures. Each attack is based on assumptions
about the nature of the regulatory process, its operative characteristics, and its goals.
Yet, there is a virtual dearth of analysis regarding these assumptions as well as the
criteria that are employed in the offensive and defensive countermoves.
In order to attain a practicable program of improvement, we must define and
analyze these assumptions. We must determine how well they fit the actual situation.
We must check them for consistency. We must reconsider the premises on which
they are founded, and determine whether their compass has been sufficiently broad
or whether it has been so narrow that vital deficiencies in the regulatory process-in-
being have been overlooked.
This section outlines the assumptions that appear to be implicit in the major
criticisms. It indicates the confined outlook reflected in these assumptions. It
suggests that the charges have been so concentrated on procedure and form that
significant progress requires a reorientation in our analysis.
A. Efficiency
A principal target set up by the critics has been the inefficiency of the admin-
istrative agencies. Proceedings take too long to complete. There are irksome delays
before any decisions are made. The procedures are too cumbersome and too ex-
pensive both for the government and for the parties who are involved. The backlogs
of cases are too large and are growing.
While this criticism may well be merited, it has not been founded on sufficient
analysis to suggest what has caused the condition, exactly how serious it is, or what
influence it has on the effects of the regulations. Available statistics indicate that a
problem exists. Backlogs have increased, and the time it takes to process many types
of cases has been lengthened. However, we have no practical gauges for determining
what is a reasonable time, nor have we evaluated what features of the process would
be lost if proceedings were accelerated. Further, we have not checked the possibility
that acceleration of some procedures might not be in the public interest.
Available statistics about backlogs and lengths of proceedings lie in the shallow
grave of averages. The data treat all proceedings as if each had equal importance.
No allowances are made for the differences in the complexity of proceedings, the
novelty of issues presented, or the practical significance of timing for various types
of procedures. Obviously, each agency has to contend with a wide range of com-
plexity in its work. Some proceedings require more extended proofs and more
detailed considerations than others. Dealing with the misrepresentation of the quality
of fur coats is not as intricate as prosecuting a sophisticated price-fixing plan that
must be established through circumstantial evidence. Nor does it warrant the same
priority on the docket.
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The issues of efficiency are tied up with procedural requisites. A requirement
that everyone who is remotely interested in a case must have his "day in court"
will inevitably extend proceedings. The provisions of the Administrative Procedure
Act, combined with the agencies' defensive posture against further attack, seem
to have pushed them into an unfortunate position. In response to this criticism,
hearing examiners and commissioners are willing to turn over every stone that might
bear on the issues of the case. Further, they are prone to allow a defense counsel
wide leeway in playing a delaying action whenever it suits his purpose.
The piling up of backlogs has been discussed widely. However, neither the
agencies, the Congress, nor the critics have attempted to set up guides for gauging
the time taken for various types of procedure. Nor has any effort gone into develop-
ing bench marks to measure the substantive importance of a proceeding and to
give it a position in some order of priorities. As a result, each proceeding seems
to warrant the same painstaking attention as every other. Unimportant questions
are taken up as readily as issues of consequence. Misrepresentations regarding a
cure for baldness are treated as seriously as a corporate merger that may have a pro-
found influence on competition in an important market.
Because of the absence of yardsticks, agencies may take on too many cases and
may devote too much time to the insubstantial ones. Similarly, commissions may
entertain appeals on insignificant issues.
On the other hand, it is possible that delays and backlogs can reflect budgetary
deficiencies rather than weak administration. The absence of criteria for analyzing
budgetary needs seems to require profound attention. Professor Parkinson has given
us not only a law, but a theology as well. However, there do seem to be occasions
when objective analysis might indicate the need for additional staff to handle greater
work loads. On such occasions, Parkinsonian theology seems to be less than enough.
The emphasis on efficiency illustrates again the shortcomings of a preoccupation
with procedure. We are all against inefficiency as a form of sin. However, a blind
pursuit of proficiency may produce better ways to do the wrong thing. An extreme
illustration of the need for relating the substance of policy to the search for efficiency
may be found in rate-making. It is conceivable, possibly probable, that a speed-up in
rate-making would harm the public interest.
Verbiage of the regulatory theories aside, the current rules for setting utility rates
boil down to the limitation of profits. By and large, costs are accepted and the
agencies' supervisory functions are limited to considering the reasonableness of the
profit component in the rates that are charged. Unfortunately, the established pat-
terns of regulation offer few incentives for reducing costs.
Now, if rate procedures were accelerated so that rate increases were granted in,
say, two weeks, the utility would lose all incentive to control costs-unless rates were
pushed to such heights that they reduced volume substantially, an unusual situation.
However, since the company knows that a rate proceeding will take several years, it
feels a pressure to keep its cost in hand. It must make some effort to maintain
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efficiency and to watch both wage rates and the prices it pays for supplies and
equipment.
Similarly, a speedy procedure would probably eliminate company incentives to
reduce costs. If any cost reduction were followed immediately by a drop in rates,
the utility would have no stimulus to push for cost savings. Hence, it would appear
to be in the public interest to continue the present procedural "inefficiency" until
affirmative policies can be developed to provide substantial spurs to operating
industrial efficiency.
In general, these drives for proficient procedures seem to disregard several
crucial points: substantive policy issues, budgetary needs, and the influence of pro-
cedural requirements. However, the need for efficiency cannot be disregarded.
The important issue is: Will we improve the regulatory process with dismally
familiar slogans, or will we push for empirical analysis to determine causes, to con-
struct bases for improvement, and to strike a reasonable balance among the factors
that affect efficiency-in both the agencies and industry?
B. The Legal Dichotomy
Some of our preoccupation with agency procedures seems to stem from a pro-
verbial dichotomy that unduly narrows the concept of the regulatory process. Many
of the critics and defenders-possibly the majority-read the regulatory process as
composed of two sharply differentiated elements: rule-making and adjudication.
Hence, many evaluations of the process are based exclusively on the effectiveness
of these two functions. Other germane activities of regulatory agencies are screened
out, and a conceptual framework emerges that is far too narrow.
Conceptually, this dichotomy fits into a legalistic pattern of analysis. Rule-
making is clearly a legislative function, while adjudication is a judicial one. The
appeal of this framework is its close relationship with the basic construct of the
tripartite system of government: legislative, executive, and judicial.
By way of contrast, these distinctions have not acquired prominence in countries
that employ a parliamentary system. In those countries, the action of a regulatory
agency is subjected to review in a parliamentary discussion in which the pertinent
minister participates. The courts are concerned only with the question of whether
the agency exceeded its authority. Nevertheless, in those other countries-in
England, for example-there seems to be no disregard of the rights of the indi-
vidual or of fair play.
While the general conception of the two functions seems to implement our checks-
and-balance theory of our governmental structure, the distinctions between the
functions have not been clear. For example, a decision to add a third carrier to the
air route between Chicago and Cleveland has been tagged as "rule-making," while
the choice of the company that will serve as the additional carrier has been described
as "adjudication." Needless to say, the classification has supported the argument that
the two decisions should be independent. Indeed, the application of some sug-
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gested cures would place the two activities in separate agencies. However, no logical
principle has been suggested to support this definition. Further, it seems highly
unlikely that a regulatory agency would decide to add a third carrier unless it has
some assurance that an adequate airline can be induced to serve the route, or unless
the agency has the power to order a company to undertake the service-an authority
that the Civil Aeronautics Board does not possess. Hence, this distinction seems
neither clear nor useful.
The use of the classification of rule-making and adjudication underlies much of
the criticism of the regulatory process. This preoccupation has blocked objective
examination of many regulatory activities. On the whole, those processes that do not
fit the classification have been ignored.
The rule-and-adjudication categories overlook a great bulk of regulatory activities.
Many, if not most, agencies must exercise their functions mainly through negotiation
and administrative decisions. Those that are charged with promoting and expanding
the industries that they regulate must consider possible industry reactions even when
they make decisions that have judicial overtones.
There are reasonably persuasive indications that the work of many agencies
would bog down if informal negotiations were discontinued. Further, a requirement
that all actions must fit into the groove of rigid, formal procedures would cause
unnecessary harm to many individuals and companies. If the Federal Trade Com-
mission were compelled to discontinue its stipulation and consent order procedures,
it would have to forego a major part of its activity. At the same time, the publicity
and expense connected with its formal proceedings would hurt many companies that
had innocently slipped into technical violations that have no substantial competitive
consequences.
The bulk of the enforcement of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act7 appears to
rest on negotiation. Experts representing the agency and the companies can settle
most problems through sensible discussions on a technical level, without the trappings
of those procedural requirements that surround a formal hearing.
Public utility commissions must employ informal negotiation and administrative
decisions. Otherwise, every service complaint would have to be ground through
the procedural machine. Otherwise, every variation in rates and every differential
or special charge would call for a full-dress rate proceeding.
The promotional functions of the agencies require negotiation. A decision to
add another route may emerge from an airline's discovery that such a route would
fit into its schedule so well that improved service could be added at low cost. The
strict rule-and-adjudication tandem would make it awkward for a commission to
entertain such a suggestion, much less act on it.
Again, promotional functions must bring a realistic note into some of the agencies'
quasi-judicial proceedings. If an applicant for a certificate of necessity obtained a
ruling that limited its capital-return too drastically, it would not construct the facility.
752 Stat 1040 (1938), 21 U.S.C. § 301 (1958).
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Hence, such a ruling would affect the growth of the industry. In such a proceeding,
the agency cannot confine its consideration to the task of formulating an insulated
judicial decision about the claims of two adversaries before it. The decision has such
a direct link with future development that the agency must consider what rate will
stimulate the investment without upsetting a general rate structure. It must, in effect,
judge whether the protesting utility is bluffing when it says that a low return will
foreclose investment funds, or whether the claim is genuine.
Because the dichotomy fails to encompass all the functions of the regulatory
process, it provides an awkward setting for the consideration of policy formulation.
It allows no distinction between policy formulation and policy enunciation. At the
same time, it overlooks the roles of the major participants in policy formulation:
Congress does more than pass laws; the President's role is not confined to issuing
formal orders; department heads and the commissions may formulate policy through
rules or case by case; agency staffs play a major role in uncovering policy problems,
gathering information, applying the general policy decisions, and calling attention
to policy deficiencies that show up in applications; the regulated industry participates
in policy formulation through its pressures for changes in policy and through the
information and arguments that it presents to the Congress, the agency, and the
courts in individual cases; and much of the policy development depends upon
judicial interpretations.
Policy formulation is a never-ending process. It calls for feedbacks of ideas and
information coming from the administration of existing policies. New problems
arise that cannot be foreseen when rules are developed. As conditions change, they
may require changes in policy.
Above all, policy-making is and must be a political process. Policies that are
more than ministerial cannot always be set by the experts of the regulatory agency.
The learned disciplines have not achieved the capacity to guarantee consideration
of all the factors in an industrial situation. Therefore, the positions taken by the
industry and others help to spot the forces that may have been overlooked in the
analysis. Further, such outside advice provides valuable clues regarding the practi-
cability of a proposed policy. Else, a theoretically-perfect policy may be broken on
the back of the political resistance in the industry, in the Congress, or in the executive
agencies.
Many policies must be forged in the case-by-case mill. Neither existing knowl-
edge nor research can provide substantial bases for all rules. Many policies must
be developed gradually, moving from problem to problem and observing the effects
of prior decisions. Without this process, some rules may be meaningless or so rigid
that they defeat some of their own purposes.
There is an important distinction between policy development and policy enunci-
ation. Some assume that regulation always requires clear-cut statements of policy.
Therefore, if no rule is announced, they believe that the regulatory processes are
injured. However, these assumptions have been neither tested nor established.
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At times, the need for flexibility may be greater than the requirements of public
knowledge. Indeed, a premature public statement may prevent an agency from
developing a sensible course.
As a matter of fact, the drive for issuing rules covering all phases overlooks
many aspects of deliberate national policy. For example, our antitrust laws are
premised on case-by-case development. No provision is made for rule-making.
The Federal Trade Commission has, on occasion, suggested guides for its staff and
industry. However, it has consistently maintained that its antitrust guides are merely
suggestions and not formal rules.
The criticisms of policy-making seem to be founded on the assumption that
the agencies refuse to issue rules because of timidity, inability, and ineffectiveness.
There seems to be no room allowed for the possibility that there exist reasonable
grounds for the agency practice or institutional pressures against such a practice.
Yet, since resistance to enunciating policy is found at every level, reasons for it
are probably more complex than mere administrative weakness. We have not in-
vestigated or evaluated the many factors behind the hesitation: the desire or need to
maintain flexibility; agencies' fear of congressional attack on enunciated rules; the
uncertainty of a generalization for lack of knowledge and analysis; the inability to
generalize; and the lack of pressure for a commitment.
As a matter of fact, frequently the reluctance to spell out policy stems from the
Congress. Often, Congress avoids policy problems by passing vague statutes. Such
a practice may be followed, on occasion, in order to permit the regulatory agency
and the courts to implement the general provisions. However, it may also be
employed in order to avoid tough political decisions, "passing the buck" to the
agency.
C. Policies and Prejudgments
Several of the criticisms are difficult to reconcile. On the one hand, it is alleged
that the agencies do not promulgate enough rules. On the other hand, agencies are
criticized for prejudging many issues. Related to these issues is an interesting
dilemma: Should agency heads maintain close contact with regulated industries
in order to develop familiarity with their operations, or should they keep the in-
dustries at judicial arm's length?
Policy-making is a form of prejudgment. The enuriciation of a rule determines
pertinent conclusions in future cases. Else, there would be no point in issuing a
regulation. Therefore, the broad, general criticisms of these two factors are difficult
to reconcile.
A more closely pointed analysis might indicate areas in which the two lines
of criticism may be reconciled. If it could be shown that an individual case is
prejudged in the absence of a policy or that the prejudgment related to an applica-
tion of policy, an agency might exercise policy-making functions and inconsistent
prejudgment at the same time. "1
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However, the broadside criticisms are difficult to evaluate. If we want clearer
policy guides, we must be reconciled to substantial prejudgment.
The problem of agency-industry contacts presents a difficult dilemma. If all
agency functions could be sharply delineated into rule-making and adjudication,
it would be possible to hang a set of principles governing industry relationships on
those two pegs. Ex parte discussions would be proper during a rule-making process
and improper in connection with adjudication. However, since the dichotomy does
not fit the day-to-day operations of the agencies, it does not provide a satisfactory basis
for constructing rules about industry relations.
If an agency exercised only one function at one time, a principle could be
formulated: during the time that a judicial proceeding is in process, all ex parte
discussions would be improper. However, some agencies rarely find a period when
only one function is exercised. An agency may have under consideration at one
time: a proposed policy; a field investigation of industry developments; a quasi-
judicial proceeding that has no promotional consequences; and a proceeding that does
have such consequences. To illustrate the differences between the last two types of
proceedings: a decision about a rate base would affect the future development of the
industry if it involved a proposed new pipeline; contrariwise, if the line had been
constructed, then the rate decision would not influence its operation.
D. The Independent Commissions
The persisting drive to mold the independent commissions in the judicial image
overlooks the historical reasons for their existence. At the same time, it provides
another demonstration of the policy quirk-comparing the actual with the ideal.
For, much of the criticism is based on a comparison of the commissions in operation
with an idealized view of the Congress and the courts.
Curiously, public consideration of the regulatory process has tended to focus on
the independent commissions and to slight the equally significant and more
numerous regulatory functions of the executive departments. This preoccupation
may be due to the rough historical coincidence of the inauguration of the commis-
sion form and of the development of scholarly interests in government regulation.
Or, it may be due to the influence of the legal profession, which has exhibited the
major interest in the field. The lawyers' admiration for the judicial process may have
found a natural outlet in the commissions, which were vested with the coloration of
"quasi-judicial."
The administrative agencies were set up precisely because it was recognized
that the Congress and the courts could not cope with the regulatory problems.
As our technological and industrial development became more complex, it became
evident that Congress could not write the detailed policies needed for business
regulation and that the courts could not apply them properly.
Congress could not devote sufficient attention to the complex problems of super-
vising industrial regulation or of guiding key industrial developments. It could not,
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for example, undertake the supervisory encouragement of the important railroad
industry. Nor could it refine policies through the case-by-case process.
The judicial procedure was not equipped for regulatory administration. Judges
could not act until questions were brought to them. They had no mechanism for
dealing with the problems of all of the members of an industry at one time, either
through one proceeding or through an organized series of actions. They could not
conduct independent investigations. They could not develop a specialized back-
ground. They lacked the capacity to handle the many involved types of regulatory
situations that required flexible give-and-take negotiation, and they did not have
adequate staff assistance for such activity.
Because of the need for developing and administering detailed policies, the
executive departments were given various supervisory powers, subject to judicial
review. However, when detailed regulation was considered for the railroads,
Congress decided to set up an independent commission. The decision was made, in
part, because many members of Congress feared to give additional powers to the
Department of the Interior, which previously supervised the railroads. Since the
Department was responsible to the President, who was a former railroad lawyer,
they felt that it might be restrained from a wholehearted safeguard of the public
interest.
After the establishment of the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1887,8 the
next important step in government regulation was the passage of the Sherman Act
in i89o,' placing administration in the hands of the Department of Justice and
the courts. However, by 194, it was felt that the Sherman Act did not meet the
needs. Both President Wilson and the Congress believed that an independent
commission was needed to make up the deficiency. The Federal Trade Commis-
sion was organized to administer its own Act,10 which contained a provision against
unfair methods of competition. At the same time, it was set up to supplement the
work of the courts in the administration of the Clayton Act," which was passed in
the same year in an effort to close some of the gaps that were found in the administra-
tion of the Sherman Act.
During the 1914 discussions, much was made of the need for an expert body.
However, even at that time, reactions were ambivalent rather than consistent.
For, having decided that more expertise was needed to effectuate the regulation,
Congress confined the powers of the Federal Trade Commission to issuing orders
to cease a specified practice. Meanwhile, the courts were left with broad discretion
about the remedies that might be imposed for violations of the Sherman and the
Clayton Acts. As a result, when the Commission finds that an industrial practice
would tend to create a monopoly, it can only order the company to discontinue the
8 24 Stat. 383 (1887), 49 U.S.C. § ii (1958).
9 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § I (1958).
10 38 Stat. 717 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1958).
1138 Stat. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1958).
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practice. On the other hand, a federal court can decide that the company should
give up patent rights, or divide the enterprise into two or more parts.
Today, a number of other regulatory commissions are charged with several
other forms of regulation-Federal Power Commission, Federal Communications
Commission, Securities and Exchange Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, Mari-
time Board, Federal Reserve Board, Tariff Commission, National Labor Relations
Board, and Atomic Energy Commission.
E. Departmental Agencies
As the regulatory functions proliferated, many were assigned to government
departments. Such departments as Health, Education, and Welfare, Agriculture,
Interior, Commerce, Post Office, Treasury, Labor, and Justice administer substantial
regulatory powers. They supervise many activities-for example, those touching
on the use of public lands, the marketing of agricultural products and those of
fisheries, minimum wages and hours, customs, immigration and related affairs, anti-
trust, literature, corporate securities, social security payments, alcoholic beverages,
food, drugs, cosmetics, and hazardous substances.
Some of the most important regulatory functions of the executive departments
rest on the authority to prosecute. The Antitrust Division of the Department of
Justice was charged with the function of prosecuting antitrust violations in the
courts. However, it has long engaged in regulation through the negotiation of
consent decrees. Under the consent procedure, the Antitrust Division and the de-
fendants conduct shirt-sleeve negotiations to work out a decree. The order is
entered by the court with the same force as a decree written by a judge after litiga-
tion, except for its status in subsequent treble-damage actions. Between eighty-five
and ninety per cent of the antitrust decrees of recent years have been negotiated in
this manner. There are indications that the majority of these consent decrees are
negotiated before any complaint is filed.
Hence, the Antitrust Division exercises the powers of a regulatory agency. In
fact, its regulatory powers appear to be more significant than those of the Federal
Trade Commission. The Antitrust Division's decrees can be more drastic than
Commission orders. Further, the Antitrust Division's negotiations are conducted
with greater leeway than th6se of the Commission. While approximately seventy
per cent of the Commission's orders are negotiated, almost no orders are discussed
until a public complaint has been filed. Therefore, the Commission's negotiations
take place in the setting of the charges listed in a public record. In contrast, the
Antitrust Division frequently formulates the complaint after it has negotiated the
consent decree, a procedure that enables it to confine the public charges to the subject-
matter of the decree.
Despite the many regulatory functions of the executive departments, criticisms of
the regulatory process have been leveled almost exclusively at the independent com-
missions. The departments issue regulations, regulate entry into business, and adjust
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controversies. Some of the functions of the departments are, as a practical matter,
subject to no judicial review. Yet, the preoccupation with the independent commis-
sions continues throughout all considerations of the regulatory process.
F. Malfeasance
Another type of criticism may be found in occasional attacks for specific mal-
feasance in office. On the whole, such charges have been related to issues of ex parte
contacts with the regulated industry. Because of this connection, efforts to avoid
questionable practices have been linked up with procedural safeguards and with
improved selection of personnel.
In this approach, the strategic relationships between the substance of regulation
and the ethical problems it generates have been largely overlooked. The influence
of a regulatory pattern that exudes the aura of a give-away program may be so
strong that procedural safeguards hardly meet the needs.
Television broadcasting provides an illustration of the need to consider problems
of substance instead of confining attention to procedure. Recent hearings showed
up questionable practices on the part of one member of the Federal Communications
Commission in his consideration of a license for a new station. Criticism was
directed to lack of ethical standards.
Unfortunately, the "affair" was used to spotlight questions of ethics, while the
underlying condition that encouraged the criticized practice was ignored. There
are reliable signs that the licensing system for television stations provides a natural
breeding ground for responses to pressures based on friendship, political favors or
contributions, and personal gain. Given the limited number of stations and the lack
of rigorous standards for screening applicants, a number of equally qualified candi-
dates are available for many franchises. Unless and until more definitive standards
can be set, there is no clear public-interest basis for choosing among those who
qualify. Against this background, there are estimates abroad that a television
license in a town of moderate size can be worth between three and four million
dollars.
In this situation, how can some form of corruption-intellectual or other-be
avoided? Regulation and exhortation against ex parte influences may only en-
courage more subtle forms of pressure. Indeed, in such situations, the only way to
force the regulators to follow their independent interpretation of the public interest
may be to encourage enough pressures on all sides. Conceivably, a complex of
pressures can serve to cancel each other. However, a procedural effort to eliminate
all pressures may only put a premium on the more subtle types resting on personal
and political friendship.
The affirmative criticism in such a situation might be more profitably directed to
substance. Can more substantial public-interest standards be forged? Until sig-
nificant progress can be had along these lines, it might be preferable to inaugurate
a bidding system awarding the license to the qualified applicant who offers to pay
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the highest annual fee. Such payments would not be difficult to justify, since the
scarcity value of the license is based upon the use of the public domain.
G. Coordination
One of the most serious deficiencies in our considerations of the regulatory process
is the preoccupation with those phases of government activity that bear a regulatory
tag. We have given insufficient attention to the wide scope of nonregulatory func-
tions that bear heavily on the regulatory burden and on its chances of meeting public
policy objectives.
Some of these activities work at cross-purposes with the regulatory functions.
Some support regulation. Many provide the basic setting for the regulation and
have a more profound influence on industry structure and practice than the regula-
tory agency can ever achieve. At the same time, not all of the regulatory activities
appear to mesh with each other.
Competitive policy is a case in point. While a great deal of regulatory activity
is dedicated to the promotion of competition, many government functions are not.
Protective tariffs and other regulations block out foreign competition. Government
purchasing and research and development programs frequently encourage industrial
concentration and partial monopoly. In fact, much of the newly developing tech-
nologies are government subsidized, and contractual arrangements may have a pro-
found effect on future industry structure. Meanwhile, some of the regulatory
agencies have used their authority to curtail competition by limiting entry into
markets and by maintaining higher rates for service than would obtain under more
competitive conditions.
The air transport industry illustrates the all pervasive influence of other govern-
ment activities on the work of a regulatory agency. The Civil Aeronautics Board
exercises a number of regulatory functions: safety, routes, service, corporate structure,
financing, and rates. Other agencies make and have made direct promotional and
development expenditures: many airports were built by the federal government
as military installations or in an effort to promote civil aviation; the program has
been continued through partial contributions to airport improvements and to road-
approach programs; safety equipment is financed and operated by the Federal
Aviation Agency; and subsidies have been paid to aid the development of the airline
companies, although today they are confined to feeder and helicopter services.
The government gives indirect aid: the development of military aircraft, which
substantially reduces the cost of civilian counterparts; mail contracts; and federal
tax exemptions for the bonds of municipalities, which finance and administer most
airports. Many other federal functions affect the airline industry: international
agreements regarding rates and routes; the coordination of military and civilian
flights; supervision of other methods of transportation, which affects airline
competition with those other forms-for example, a railroad can be permitted to
discontinue passenger service to small communities because subsidies are paid to
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feeder airlines that will serve those communities; and the relationship between the
rates set for railroads, trucks, and bus lines, which affects the level of airline fares and
the volume of traffic.
Given such a variety of functions, evaluation of the regulation of rates and routes
should take the entire pattern into account. Indeed, such evaluation should en-
compass the lack of coordination. Determinations regarding routes and rates depend
upon a host of other functions. Safety regulations may increase operating costs.
International pressures and rivalry may force airlines into expensive jet operations
and investments before they are necessary. On the other hand, airport and road
subsidies, the development of military prototypes of civilian aircraft, and operating
subsidies may reduce airline costs and serve to increase the volume of traffic.
Further, other regulatory and nonregulatory activities bearing on competing services,
as well as the complementary features of transportation and communication by road,
railroad track, water, wire, and radio, have a substantial influence on airline traffic
and costs. In this setting, the regulatory process is part of a complex of government-
industry relations. In fact, the final rate-role of the Civil Aeronautics Board may
serve mainly to control the profit component of price, while other government
activities control the cost component, which is clearly the more important.
III
THE NEEDS FOR EVALUATION
As stated above, we require a fresh look at the regulatory process. The estab-
lished confines of evaluation set such narrow limits for the public consideration of
the problem that many of the most important public policy issues are slighted.
Affirmative progress will require developing a broader orientation and avoiding a
preoccupation with procedural problems.
Positive progress requires a recognition of the political nature of the regulatory
process. For if regulatory problems are treated exclusively as technical questions,
we will probably continue to confine our efforts to procedural issues.
In this examination, we must consider the relative advantages of the independent
commission and the executive department. Such inquiry may indicate that one form
is superior to the other for certain purposes. At the same time, it should provide
clues to the most fruitful way to employ each form.
Finally, for basic evaluation we must develop criteria for policy evaluation and
methods of policy review. Else, we shall continue to avoid the more important and
more difficult problems and cater to our preoccupation with the peripheral issues
of procedure.
A. Nature of the Regulatory Process
While the regulatory process finds expression in legal procedures, it must be
recognized as a political function and not an exercise in technical jurisprudence.
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As a governmental activity, regulation has a political orientation in its inception.
Both policy formulation and execution are dependent on political outlooks and
pressures.
Many critics, as well as supporters, either seem to ignore or want to avoid the
political nature of the process. Independent agencies were frequently promoted
by reform movements in order to avoid the pressure of politics and to base regula-
tion on the nonpolitical analysis of the expert. However, Congress had to set the
policy framework and will continue to do so, while the President can exercise varying
degrees of leadership. Similarly, the regulated interests strive to influence the
agencies in order to maximize their private goals. Hence, while the members of a
commission are expected to maintain the cool aloofness of a judge, they are also
required to maintain contact with the economic developments and to cope with
political problems.
Part of the difficulty is probably semantic. "Political" is a term that covers a
wide variety of concepts from the quid pro quo of activity in dishonest wards to the
broad concept of the "body politic."
Somewhere between these extremes, there is an interpretation of "political" that
reflects the workings of government organization, that encompasses the operations
of political parties but that is not confined to them, and that recognizes the limita-
tions of "independence" and the forces of pluralism in our society. Such a concept
recognizes: that commissions are not completely independent agents free of political
pressures and controls; that congressional committees are influenced by public
opinion, the force of the press, and attitudes of other members of Congress; and that
congressmen are influenced by popular opinion, their prospects for re-election, and
the strength of partisan forces. The President, in turn, must consider popular atti-
tudes, congressional pressures, party problems, and, in many instances, international
factors.
In this context, the regulatory process is necessarily more political than the
judicial. Moreover, even the judicial function, which is somewhat insulated from the
political, is not entirely free. While judicial tenure is not political, the selection of
judges is. What is more significant is that the selection of cases to prosecute and
the legal theories underlying enforcement are in the hands of the regulatory agencies.
No judge can affirmatively decide that a problem should be brought before him.
The judicial process assigns him a passive role. Ultimately, he is bound by the
evidence and arguments presented to him. He is not expected to take affirmative
action either to investigate the evidence or to forge legal analysis that is unrelated
to the arguments that have been presented to him. His work is strongly influenced
by the activities of the regulatory agencies, which must participate actively in the
broad process of government.
While regulation must accommodate and utilize the analysis of the technician,
it cannot rest exclusively on technical expertise. In the development of policy, the
expert is needed to suggest alternatives, to analyze them, and to predict their conse-
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quences. However, the policy-maker must take account of the practicability and
acceptability of the alternatives. The technician is required also in the administra-
tion of policy. Yet, the selection of cases, decisions about what problems to give
priority, and final administrative conclusions require political as well as technical
judgment.
As we have seen, the host of government activities that impinge on the regulatory
fields are so important that they cannot be disregarded in any realistic evaluation or
administration of regulatory policies. This feature is especially significant because it
demonstrates the essential shortcoming of the exclusive legal-judicial interpretations
of the regulatory functions.
For all of these reasons, the regulatory process is and must be political. Efforts
to avoid or to ignore this condition have produced insubstantial results. These efforts
have led us to accept a priori analysis because of the legal liking for the employment
of precedent and principle. As a result, we have tended to formulate principles for
judgment too quickly. We have generalized on the basis of slight evidence. Above
all, we have clearly held back the empirical analysis that is so badly needed.
B. Nature of Independence
Because of the efforts to regard the regulatory process as a technical function, the
nature of the independent commission has been assumed to be clear without further
consideration. We have not compared the relative strengths and weaknesses of such
commissions with those of the single-headed agencies that may carry on similar func-
tions. More seriously, after clothing the commissions in judicial robes that may not
fit, we have criticized the wearers for not bearing the garments properly, instead
of considering whether the robes fit the needs.
Many of the basic concepts of the commissions need clarification. Merely calling
them the fourth branch of government offers no road to understanding. The
single-head departments also combine legislative, judicial, and executive functions.
The conceptual nature of commission independence has not been defined. The
commissions are not responsible to the President. Yet, he appoints all commissioners
with the advice and consent of the Senate, and he designates the chairman of each,
except for the Interstate Commerce Commission. His power to remove a com-
missioner is sharply limited. On the other hand, budget requests of the commis-
sions go through his Bureau of the Budget, as do legislative recommendations, with
one exception.
Commissions have carried a second tag, "arms of the Congress," which may
provide a better clue to their position in the federal framework. There is room
for believing that the major reason for the independence of the commissions is the
rivalry between the Congress and the executive branch. Congress regards the in-
dependent commissions as its own agencies, independent of the President, following
the tradition of the Interstate Commerce Commission. However, the general pat-
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tern is so unclear that the designation has led some to believe that the commissions
are and should be independent of everyone.
The confusion has been compounded by the status and functions of the hearing
examiners employed by the commissions. In order to promote a judicial aura around
the regulatory procedures, a number of efforts have been made to give the hearing
examiners a high degree of independence. However, the basic status of the examiners
has neither been analyzed nor been settled. Are they autonomous judges who act
in their own independent capacities? Are they arms of the commissions, empowered
to hold hearings in the agency's name and to report back their findings and to
suggest decisions? Some of the efforts to change regulatory procedure seem to be
directed to constituting the hearing examiners as district judges and the com-
missions as appellate courts. However, this direction has not been founded on a
broad consideration of the functions of either the examiners or the commissions.
Nor has it been based on an analysis of where the commissions fit in the general
framework of government.
We need to develop an analytical structure for the relationship between the
independent commissions and the executive departments. The relative strengths
and weaknesses of the two need investigation to promote a clearer understanding
of their functions.
The independent commission might have greater capacity for more independent
judicial action and for closer relations with the Congress. Because of staggered
terms and bipartisan composition, the commission might be able to maintain more
stable policies in the face of changes in the administration.
On the other hand, the single-headed agency can enjoy a more affirmative direction.
It can be coordinated more readily with the administrative policies that affect the
pertinent industries through the many public activities that do not fit the legal
definition of regulation. Its policies and activities can be coordinated with other
regulatory functions more effectively.
Peculiarly, the single-headed agencies seem to have less congressional difficulty
than the commissions. We clearly need empirical analysis to check this general
impression and to discover the reasons for the condition.
Another difference between the two types lies in the method of treating charges
of corruption, inefficiency, or poor judgment. When charges were made against
a Secretary of the Air Force, President Eisenhower had no difficulty in replacing
him. After the change, criticisms of the Air Force disappeared and the new Secre-
tary carried on without unusual difficulty. In contrast, recent attacks on the Federal
Communications Commission have been much harder to meet. Although one
member of the Commission was dropped, the congressional criticism has continued.
The development of a satisfactory situation is difficult. It would be impractical
and unfair to replace all of the members of the Commission, or to set up a new
body in the same way that the old Federal Radio Commission was treated. How-
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ever, the steady stream of criticism can have such a demoralizing influence on both
the Commission and its staff that positive action for improvement is impeded.
Currently we are employing both forms for similar activities without even
attempting to analyze which is better suited for what task. In one field, antitrust,
we have overlapping functions assigned to a commission and a department. As
demonstrated in the discussion of the consent procedures, the Justice Department
seems to exercise more discretionary power than the Federal Trade Commission.
Yet, all efforts at procedural safeguards are directed to the Commission and not
to the Department. Further, when the Department executes its functions through
the courts, the procedural requirements, the substantive elements in some violations,
and the nature of the remedies differ from those of the Commission.
An analytical re-examination should encompass both types of agencies. We
must consider the regulatory process as a whole. Unless we can avoid the con-
ventional preoccupation with the agency form, we will continue to impose restraints
on our progress toward practical improvements in our regulatory functions.
C. Criteria for Evaluation
An outstanding feature in the consideration of the regulatory process is the need
for developing criteria for judgment. Most discussions rest on many yardsticks
that are assumed but that are not enunciated or analyzed. On what basis should
we evaluate the work of the agencies; how do we gauge their effectiveness; what
yardsticks can be established to judge the length of time an administrative proceeding
should take; what are the relative balances between assuring defendants and
respondents that they will have their "day in court," and making sure that the
proceedings are handled with expedition? Should we concentrate on procedure or
give equal attention to effect? How should we evaluate policy?
By and large, evaluations concentrate on procedure. Little attention is paid to
the effects of the regulation. Complaints are heard on all sides about delays in reach-
ing decisions, but little or no consideration is paid to the question of how much
time is enough. There is a dearth of attention to the need for policy review
probably on the assumption that judicial review is sufficient.
However, any meaningful evaluation of the regulatory process should include a
review of its industrial influence. Starting with the basic objectives of the regulation,
analysis of economic and social effect should be foremost in evaluation. Such in-
quiry should relate the content of the regulation to its ultimate goals and should en-
compass the economic pressures within the regulated industry. At the same time, the
rules should be reviewed to determine practicability and side effects.
The regulation of the television industry is in point. The goal behind the regula-
tory legislation seems to be to raise program levels. This objective calls for catering
to minority groups that are interested in educational and cultural activities. How-
ever, raising program levels through regulation is an impossible task until we
develop practical yardsticks for evaluation.
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Furthermore, the economic conditions in the industry would seem to militate
against educational and cultural programs. Given the limited number of channels
available for television broadcasting, it seems likely that each station would find a
larger listener audience by broadcasting "westerns" rather than informative and
symphonic programs. Given three stations in a town, each would try to attract
one-third of the "western" fans if it appeared that seventy-five per cent of the
viewers wanted such programs. The alternative would be to cater to the next
largest class-say, the ten per cent who are interested in symphonies.
Unless the number of channels can be increased, as in the case of radio with
its good music stations, it would seem difficult to do very much about raising
program quality. Therefore, it is quite possible that the underlying goals cannot
be achieved by the current type of regulation. It may be practicable to force wider
use of the UHF bands in order to increase the number of stations sufficiently to
follow the radio pattern. Indeed, the goals of regulation might be furthered by a
government-subsidized research program to increase the number of channels in use.
On the other hand, it may be preferable to discontinue the frustrating efforts
to improve programming in the commercial stations. Perhaps the only effective
solution would be to subsidize eleemosynary stations that are dedicated to educa-
tional and cultural programs. If such a move were considered, part of the funds
could be raised through the annual fees developed by auctioning commercial
licenses.
It should be noted that these illustrations are presented not as recommendations,
but to demonstrate the prime need for developing criteria for evaluation that are
based primarily on subject matter and only secondarily on procedure. What is the
point of slavishly formulating procedures to avoid corruption if the underlying
regulation provides a breeding place? What benefit is there in accelerating the
process if it is headed in the wrong direction? Is there some advantage in the slow
process if, as in rate regulation, it were to provide the only or major incentive for
industrial efficiency?
D. Review and Generalization
Policy evaluation entails two important elements: the mechanism for policy
review, and the development of appropriate levels for generalization. There are
significant limitations affecting each of these functions today. Both reflect the great
need to replace a piori argument with substantial empirical analysis.
We lack procedures for policy review. One of the main thrusts of the pro-
cedural considerations has been to develop adequate mechanisms for reviewing the
work of the agencies. However, this campaign has not proceeded beyond judicial
review. Little or no attention has been paid to broad policy evaluation as opposed
to the case-by-case scrutiny of the courts.
The judiciary is not equipped for policy review. Judges rarely have an opportu-
nity to consider a number of cases about the same subject at one time. They have
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no basis for investigating the many problems that are handled by negotiation. They
could not properly consider the relations between regulatory and nonregulatory
functions.
Congressional and executive functions provide the only basis for policy review.
However, we have not appreciated the need for such inquiry on a sustained, organ-
ized basis. True, there have been a goodly number of substantial investigations.
However, they have been sporadic and have lacked follow-up studies. Agencies
have been checked more frequently for specific incidents, for budgets, and for
procedure than for substantive policy.
Some of the methods for reviewing the work of the agencies require serious
reconsideration. For example, during budgetary scrutiny of the work of the Anti-
trust Division and the Federal Trade Commission, attention seems to be directed
to the number of cases instituted and of cases won. These yardsticks have probably
pushed the agencies into a type of numbers game. By prosecuting small companies
in unimportant markets, it is possible to start many proceedings and to obtain many
consent orders through negotiation. The effects of the proceedings can be ignored
as long as there is a great deal of motion.
One of the profound problems in policy review, as well as in procedural considera-
tion, is the determination of what generalizations are appropriate. Many con-
clusions are hasty generalizations based on scanty information. The bothersome
question is how to know that a review of one agency or two has any application
to others.
On the other hand, many have taken the position, express or implied, that each
agency is unique and even that each regulatory function is sui generis. This attitude
would allow no room for generalization or principle. It would suggest that the
experience of one agency can shed no light on the problems of any other.
Differences among the agencies are important. Compare, for example, the Civil
Aeronautics Board and the Federal Trade Commission. The CAB deals with a
handful of carriers in competition with each other. It must consider indirect effects
of almost all decisions on this competitive situation. It deals regularly with the
same "constituents." In contrast, the FTC has no closed group of companies under
its jurisdiction. Most of its respondents have had only one experience with the
Commission. It does not have to consider a continuity of relations.
However, there are levels of generalization that are appropriate. They require
careful, sustained study of many situations. They cannot be achieved by any
quick, dramatic flashes. Yet, basic progress in the analysis of the regulatory process
requires that we drive for appropriate generalization and avoid the precipitate,
overly broad conclusion.
CONCLUSION
The regulatory process is fast becoming an ubiquitous element in national life.
All signs point to further increases in government acti.t. The combined influ-
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ences of regulation and direct government operations affect all phases of economic
and social endeavor.
However, we move in this direction with heavy ambivalence. Our national
tradition points to a minimum of government interference. Yet, we look to govern-
mental solutions for the many new problems that stem from the additional complica-
tions of economic activity, greater sectional interdependence, striking technological
changes, and an uncertain international situation.
Our consideration of the regulatory process is colored by anxiety. We have great
difficulty in finding a straight path. The process calls for the continual balancing
of many interests and the resolution of many conflicts. Hence, with changing needs
and pressures, it is almost impossible to chart a stable, consistent policy course.
As a result, the practical treatment of the regulatory process requires a recogni-
tion of its complexities and its dynamic fluctuations. We do not seem destined for
a clear, resolute path in any phase of regulation. Unless and until we accept these
underlying conditions, we will continue to seek the simple maxims that do not meet
the complex analysis that the process requires.
In this setting, it would appear that much of our preoccupation with procedural
problems simply permits us to avoid the tough policy issues. Unfortunately, settling
issues of procedure and organization will not take care of the basic needs of the
regulatory process. Procedures do have important influences. They can affect the
equities and efficiencies of government activity. They can either help us to resolve
policy issues or hinder such resolution. However, they do not constitute the sole
feature of our regulatory pattern, and they avoid the important consequences of
other types of governmental activity.
Above all, we need further empirical research and broad analysis to clarify how
regulation works. We require a clearer understanding of where the process fits
into the complex of our economic, political, and social goals. We should have more
definitive information of just how the participants in the process function. We
badly need a broader view of the basic issues that deserve attention.
